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Behind the Lighthouse Effect
* 
 
A large body of empirical literature indicates that, contrary to predictions from economic 
theory, wages in the informal sector increase after any minimum wage hike. This 
phenomenon was so far explained as a byproduct of a signal conveyed by statutory minimum 
wages to wage setting in the informal sector, as if workers in the latter had significant 
bargaining power. A simple matching model shows that the lighthouse effect may be induced 
by significant sorting and composition effects between the formal and shadow sectors in the 
aftermath of the increase in the minimum wage. Using data on Brazil, we test this alternative 
explanation of the lighthouse effect, associated with the endogenous sorting of workers by 
skill in the formal and informal sectors. We find that sorting accounts for at least one third of 
the increase in average wages in the informal sector after the minimum wage hike. This 
contribution of sorting to wage dynamics in the informal sector is also increasing over time. 
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Economic theory predicts that the introduction of a minimum wage in a dual economy (with a
signiﬁcant portion of the workforce employed in the informal sector) should depress wages in the
labor market segment in which the regulation is not enforced. However, much empirical literature,
notably on Latin American countries, indicates that wages actually increase in the informal sector
after a minimum wage hike. The literature explains this fact in terms of a signal given to wage
setting in the informal sector, a lighthouse eﬀect, inducing workers in the informal sector to ask for
higher wages. This explanation requires that workers in the informal sector do retain substantial
bargaining power, something that is lacking empirical support and we ﬁnd rather unconvincing.
In this paper we provide an alternative rationale for the lighthouse eﬀect on the basis of the
shadow sorting model provided by Boeri and Garibaldi (2005), where workers and ﬁrms self-select
themselves into a formal and an informal sectors. The baseline equilibrium implies a separation of
the two labor market segments by skills: low-skilled workers operate in the informal sector and high
skilled workers in the formal sector, an implication which is well supported by the data on a variety
of countries, including Brazil. The model implies also that the introduction of the minimum wage
induces a change in the skill composition of the workforce in the two sectors, and in particular a
shift of relatively skilled workers into the informal sector as well as a shift of very low skilled workers
in the formal sector. These composition eﬀects induce an increase in the average productivity and
average wage in the informal sector. Beyond these labor supply eﬀects, the introduction of the
minimum wage has also a standard wage cost eﬀect that tends to reduce employment in the formal
sector. Novertheless, our qualitative analysis shows that an increase in the minimum wage in the
informal sector, related to a composition eﬀect, is present also in the general equilibrium.
We test our alternative explanation by drawing on data from Brazil, allowing to track workers
and wages across the shadow margins. We ﬁnd support for both, the substantive assumptions of the
model (the fact that unskilled workers are concentrated in the informal sector) and its implications
(the fact that a minimum wage hike increases the average skill content in the informal sector). We
also decompose the total variation in the average wage of the informal sector between the period
immediately before and after the change in the minimum wage ﬁnding that the "sorting" eﬀect
may account for at least one third of the increase in average wages in the informal sector after the
minimum wage hike. Moreover, this contribution of sorting is increasing over time.
2The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the lighthouse eﬀect, presents
the Brazilian data and provides some evidence on the eﬀects of minimum wage hikes on wages
in the informal sector. Section 3 presents the baseline shadow sorting model and extends it to
accommodate a minimum wage. It then analyses the mechanics behind the lighthouse eﬀect,
obtaining a set of propositions that can be taken to the data. Section 4 then goes back to the data
and evaluates these empirical implications. Finally, Section 5 brieﬂy summarizes and concludes.
2 The "Lighthouse Eﬀect"
2.1 Literature review
A standard case considered by economic theory in which a minimum wage does not have a neg-
ative eﬀect on employment is a dual labor market where the minimum wage does not apply to
the secondary or informal labor market. As pointed out by Welch (1976), Gramlich (1976) and
Mincer (1976), following a minimum wage hike, workers displaced in the formal sector move to the
uncovered sector. Hence, as depicted in Figure 1, wages in the informal sector fall (from 
 to 
1)
and labor supply in the formal sector declines (shifting the  curve to the left). The minimum
wage then reallocates jobs from the formal to the informal sector, increasing the diﬀerence between
formal and informal wages. This adjustment mechanism prevents fully employment losses only
if there is perfect labor mobility between the two sectors and wages are perfectly ﬂexible in the
informal sector. Insofar as workers losing their job have no access or limited access to unemploy-
ment beneﬁts (Gindling and Terrell, 2004; Maloney and Nunez, 2003), this assumption seems to
be acceptable in a relatively large number of developing countries.
Contrary to this theoretical prediction, studies on developing countries (Lemos, 2004, and Fa-
jnzylber, 2001, for Brazil; Gindling and Terrell 2004b for Costa Rica; Jones, 1997, for Ghana) where
the informal sector is particularly large quite surprisingly observed instead an increase in wages
also in the informal sector after a minimum wage hike. Nothwistanding measurement problems,
this eﬀect seems rather robust to alternative speciﬁcations of the wage equation in the two sectors
(Amadeo, Gill, and Neri, 2000, Maloney and Nunez, 2003; Neri, Gonzaga and Camargo, 2000),
notably in Brazil where data on the informal sector are considered to be more reliable.
The interpretation provided by this literature is that the minimum wage set in the formal
sector is a sort of reference price, a signal for bargaining, throughout the economy at large. If ﬁrms
3Figure 1: The standard theoretical prediction
have monopsonistic power also in the informal sector, and “fair remuneration" considerations are
relevant, it is possible that changes in the minimum wage in the formal (and covered) sector lead
to corresponding increases in the average wage of the informal sector. The term "Efeito Farol"o r
"lighthouse eﬀect" (Souza and Baltar, 1980) has been used to denote this phenomenon.
No doubt, in countries such as Brazil, the minimum wage provides a reference in the deﬁnition
of many public sector (including local administrations) wages and some cash transfers and it is also
used within collective bargaining in the private sector. It is indeed very common for workers to
have their wages deﬁned as multiples of the minimum wage (Amadeo et. al 2000; Camargo,1984,
Neri, 1997). However, it is doubtful that in presence of signiﬁcant ﬂows of workers from the formal
to the informal sector, this positive social reference eﬀect on wages could prevail over the negative
labor supply shock eﬀect, induced by the presence of a downward sloping labor demand.
Alternative interpretations have called into play substitution eﬀects. Employers could react to
a minimum wage hike, by substituting formal workers for informal ones, and the stronger demand
for informal workers could more than oﬀset the increase of labor supply in this sector, inducing an
increase in the informal sector wages (Fajnzylber 2001).
Other scholars have challenged the idea that the informal sector oﬀers lower quality jobs than
the formal sector (Maloney, 1999). Under such conditions, an increase in the minimum wage may
make the formal sector a more attractive destination to some informal workers and actually induce
a decrease in the supply of labor in the informal sector, resulting in an increase in informal sector
wages.
Although the empirical literature on minimum wages in developing countries is still rather
4young, due to a paucity of data, there is some literature on the lighthouse eﬀect also for other
Latin American countries. Maloney and Nunez (2003) found evidence of the lighthouse eﬀect in
Mexico, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Chile, Honduras and Colombia. They actually concluded that
in these countries the inﬂuence of the minimum wage appears to be more signiﬁcant in the informal
sector than in the formal sector. Gindling and Terrell (2004), however, do not ﬁnd evidence of the
lighthouse eﬀect in Costa Rica.
2.2 Deﬁnitions and data
The consensus deﬁnition of the shadow economy is “all economic activities which contribute to
the oﬃcially calculated (or observed) gross national product, but escape detection in the oﬃcial
estimates of GDP” (Feige, 1989 and 1994; Lubell, 1991 and Schneider 1994). This deﬁnition
encompasses not only legal, but also illegal activities, such as trade in stolen goods, drug dealing,
gambling, smuggling, etc.. In this paper we conﬁne our attention to a subset of the shadow economy,
namely to legal activities. Our notion of shadow employment is one of a lawful activity were it
reported to tax authorities and subject to work regulations, as our aim is to contribute to the
literature on the enforcement of labor regulations and to complement research on tax evasion,
which has so far overlooked the eﬀects of tax evasion and shadow employment on unemployment1.
The data set we use for our analysis is the Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego (PME), a longitudi-
nal survey performed by the Brazilian statistical agency (IBGE) since 1980. PME is a monthly
employment survey of households in 6 of the major Brazilian metropolitan regions, namely Bahia,
Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul. It is organized as a
rotating panel, interviewing each of the households for four consecutive months, not interviewing
them for the next eight months and then interviewing them again for four months before they are
deﬁnitely excluded from the sample, as summarized by Table 1.
1See Burdett, Lagos and Wright (2000) for an analysis of the relationship between crime and unemployment.
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Althought the increase of the informality in the Brazilian labor market dates back to the 1980s, it
is only in the 1990s that it became really signiﬁcant, independently of cyclical ﬂuctuations (Amadeo
et al., 1994).
According to the Brazilian legislation, all workers must have a signed work card; workers with-
out such a card are considered informal workers since they do not pay taxes and social security
contributions. In the PME there is a question that asks the interviewee if she/he has this work
card, so that it is possible to disentangle formal from informal sector workers 2. This distinction,
however, does not apply to the civil servants. Hence, in our analysis we decided to focus only on
private sector employees.
Table 1 below provides some descriptive statistics on formal vs informal sector employees in
the various years covered by our analysis. Informal sector workers in our sample represent roughly
one third of the employees. Other studies (Ulyseea (2006)) reach estimates as high as 40 per cent,
so that it is quite possible that our data undersample shadow sector workers. Women and young
workers are overrepresented in the informal sector compared with the formal sector. Over time,
educational attainments are increasing in both sectors, probably as a result of the eﬀorts put by the
Brazilian Government to increase the education level of the population. Consistently with evidence
on other countries, formal sector employees are, on average, more educated than informal sector
ones, a key prediction of the model originally presented by Boeri and Garibaldi (2005) and further
discussed below.
2Many authors also consider the self-employed as belonging to the informal sector. In our analysis we will focus
only on employees.
6Table 2. Descriptive statistics on the two sectors
Total Female Age Education Nom. wage
(years) (years) (ln, Reais h.)
For Inf For Inf For Inf For Inf For Inf
1995 208242 86038 36.58% 43.29% 33.25 30.05 7.48 6.03 3.34 2.78
(.48) (.49) (10.97) (12.84) (4.06) (3.81) (.88) (.89)
2000 198166 97216 39.90% 45.24% 33.82 31.95 8.56 7.43 3.80 3.34
(.49) (.50) (10.85) (12.77) (3.91) (3.91) (.81) (.85)
2.3 Minimum Wage Adjustments, Spikes and the Lighthouse Eﬀect in Brazil
The ﬁrst minimum wage was introduced in Brazil in 1940. The level was established in each region
by a Wage Commission whose main concern was to provide subsistence remuneration of a single
adult worker for a normal working day. Since 1984 the minimum wage is set at the national level.
The Constitution (approved in 1988) states that the minimum wage should be the same throughout
the country and must be suﬃcient to meet the basic needs of workers and their families, in terms of
housing, education, health, recreation, clothing, hygiene, transportation, and social security. The
wage is adjusted periodically by the Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego to preserve its purchasing
power and there is also a norm prohibiting the use of minimum wage as an indexation parameter
for other transfers. Nevertheless, such a norm is rarely enforced.
Our analysis covers the period 1995 to 2000 neglecting the previous years of hyperinﬂation.Over
this period the minimum wage was adjusted annually in May except for the year 2000, when the
adjustment occurred in April. In this 6-years period, the level of the real hourly minimum wage
experienced a large increase in May 1995 and then declined to increase again towards the end of the
decade to match its real value in 1995 (250 Reais at 2007 prices, Figure 2). The minimum wage,
however, declined relative to the average wage, notably in the informal sector (Figure 3 ), which
reduced over time its (shadow) wage gap with respect to the formal sector.
Figure 4 plots the Kernel density estimator for the distribution of wages of formal sector em-
ployees before and after (bold line) the May 1995 minimum wage hike which increased its level
from 70 Reais (nominal value) to 100 Reais, almost a 43% increase. Figure 5 provides the same
distributions for informal sector employees.
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Figure 2: Evolution of real and nominal minimum wage. Brazil: 1995-2000.
also the spikes of the two distributions move to the right. Signiﬁcantly, it is precisely the distribution
of wages for informal sector workers that displays spikes in correspondence to the old and new level
of the minimum wage. This is precisely a lighthouse eﬀect. Thus, our data also suggest that wages
in the informal sector increase as a result of minimum wage hikes, as pointed out by the literature
on the lighthouse eﬀect. The model of the next section highlights a new sorting mechanisms for
rationalizing these changes.
3 A Shadow Sorting Model and the Minimum Wage
3.1 Shadow Employment and Worker’s Sorting
We consider an economy with a measure one of heterogenous workers and two sectors. The worker
type is indicated by ,w h e r e refers to labor market productivity and its value is drawn from a
continuous cumulative distribution function  with support [minmax].  is a ﬁxed time invariant
worker characteristic, with min  0.
There are two sectors in the labor market: the regular sector and the shadow sector. The gross
value of production of each worker is indicated with  where  is an idiosyncratic component of
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Figure 3: Real minimum wage as proportion of the average wage
employ a worker, so that the productivity of the worker is  − . In the shadow sector the tax is
evaded and there is an instantaneous monitoring rate equal to . Conditional on being monitored
in the shadow sector, the shadow job is destroyed. Both regular and shadow jobs are otherwise
exogenously destroyed at rate 3
Firms can freely post a vacancy in either sector. We focus on single jobs, and each ﬁrm is made
of one job. Posting a vacancy in the regular sector costs  per period while in the shadow sector
costs .T h e r ei sf r e ee n t r yo fﬁrms in both sectors and the equilibrium value of a vacancy is driven
down to zero. Job creation characterizes the labor demand side of the model.
The labor supply is governed by the workers’ sorting behavior. Workers are endowed with a
unit of time and freely decide whether its is optimal to search and work in the shadow sector or
in the legal sector. Entering a sector is a full-time activity, and workers cannot simultaneously
work and/or search in both sectors. In the legal sector there is a speciﬁc unemployed income (the
unemployment beneﬁts) which is not available in the shadow sector.
Labor markets are imperfect, and there are market frictions in each sector. We follow the main
matching literature (Pissarides, 2000), and assume that the meeting of vacant jobs and unemployed
workers is regulated by a matching function with constant returns to scale. Diﬀerent matching
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Figure 5: Density of hourly wage in the informal sector
10functions exist in diﬀerent sectors. In what follows we let with  and  be the number of vacancies
in both sectors, and  and  the number of unemployed job seekers. The matching function in
each sector is indicated with
()  = 
with positive ﬁrst derivative and negative second derivative. As in the traditional matching models
with constant returns to scale, the transition rate depends on the relative number of traders, a
suﬃcient statistics which is indicated with  = 











() with 0  0.
3.2 Wages and Minimum Wages
Successful matches in each sector enjoy a pure economic rent. We assume that in each sector wages
obtain a fraction  of the marginal productivity . Yet, in the legal sector, and only in the legal





( − ) if ( − ) ≥ min
min if ( − )  min
In other words wages obtain a fraction  of the marginal product as long such value is above the
minimum wage. In the shadow sector the wage is simply the fraction  of the marginal product
and there is no minimum wage
()=
We solve the model in four steps. First, we present the value functions and the asset equations
and deﬁne the key equilibrium conditions without the minimum wages. Second, we solve the
workers’ sorting behaviour in partial equilibrium, taking as given job creation (the labor demand
side of the model) and the transition rate in each market. The eﬀects of the minimum wage on the
workers’ sorting behaviour is discussed in some details. Next, we discuss the extension of the model
when the job creation condition is taken into account. The purpose of the theoretical analysis is to
derive a set of predictions linked to the moonlight eﬀects in the aftermath of the minimum wage.
For more analytical details of the model we refer to Boeri-Garibaldi (2006).
113.3 Value Functions with a non binding minimum wage
We ﬁrst assume that the minimum wage is not binding,s ot h a ti ti si r r e l e v a n tf o ro u ra n a l y s i s .W e
introduce a binding minimum wage in the next subsections. The value of a ﬁl l e dj o bi nt h el e g a l
sector with productivity  reads
()= − −  + [  − ()]
where  is the tax rate,   is the value of a vacancy and  is the pure discount rate. Jobs are
destroyed at the exogenous rate  and  is the wage rate.
Unemployment is a full time activity, and workers cannot work in the shadow sector during an
unemployment spell. The value of unemployment in the legal sector for a worker of type  is
()= + ()[() − ()]
where  is the speciﬁc unemployed income (the unemployment beneﬁts), and () is the value of
the job for a type .T h ev a l u eo faj o bi nt h el e g a ls e c t o ri s
()=( − )+[() − ()]
Posting vacancies in the legal sector is costly, and yields a per period return equal to −.
Conditional on meeting a worker, at rate (),t h eﬁrm gets the expected value of a job. In
formula, its expression reads
 = − + (
)[ [() |  ∈ Ω] −  ]
where the expectation is taken with respect to the productivity of workers that search in the legal
sector. The expression Ω refers to the support of workers who search in the legal sector.
The value functions for jobs in the shadow sector are similarly deﬁned. The main diﬀerences
is that in the shadow sector ﬁrms do not pay the production tax  and the job is monitored and
destroyed at rate . Further, there is no speciﬁc unemployed income . The four value functions
read
()= − +(  + )[  − ()]
()=+(  + )[() − ()]
()=(
)[() − ()]





() |  ∈ Ω¤
−  ¤
where Ω is support of workers that search in the shadow sector.
123.4 Equilibrium Conditions Without the Minimum Wage
There are three key equilibrium conditions
• Free entry and job creation in the legal sector (), which implies that the value of a vacancy
be zero
  =0
This equation will determine market tightness in the legal sector 
• Free entry and job creation in the shadow sector (), which implies that the value of a
vacancy be zero
  = 
This equation will determine market tightness in the shadow sector 
• Workers’ sorting () If we assume that workers’ sorting satisﬁes the reservation property,
(a feature that holds in equilibrium) the labor supply is described by the marginal worker
with productivity ,w h e r e is the productivity level for which the worker is indiﬀerent
between the two sectors, so that
()=()
Using the reservation property, the three key conditions are
(
)[() − ()] =  + (


















The ﬁrst condition states that the marginal worker is indiﬀerent between searching for a job in
the legal or in the shadow sector. The second condition states that the total search costs in the legal
sector are identical to the expected value of a job. The last condition has a similar interpretation,
but refers to the shadow sector. The system determines the three endogenous variables  and

133.5 Stocks
The model is closed by determining the stock of workers into the four possible labor market states:
unemployment and employment in each of the two sectors. If we indicate with  the stock of
u n e m p l o y e di ne a c hs e c t o ra n dw i t h the stock of employed, we have
 +  +  +  =1
Workers’ sorting in the baseline model implies that the share of workers in the shadow sector is ()
while the remaining 1 − () workers search in the legal sector. Unemployment and employment
in the shadow sector read respectively
 =
( + )()





 +  + (
)










We are now in a position to formally deﬁne the equilibrium of the model.
Deﬁnition 1 Baseline Equilibrium. The equilibrium is obtained by a triple  and  and a
vector of stock variables that satisfy the value functions  ( = ), and i) Workers’
sorting, ii) Job Creation in the legal sector, iii) Job Creation in the shadow sector, iv) balance ﬂow
conditions.
3.6 Solving the worker’s sorting behavior
The worker chooses the sector in which to enter on the basis of a simple comparison between the
value of unemployment in each sector. Using an expression for the value of employment ,t h e








[ − ] − 
 +  + (
)
14Figure 6 shows the two value functions in partial equilibrium as a function of the productivity
. The diﬀerences in the two curves are driven by the intercept (which is negative in the legal
sector) and by the slope. We make two key assumptions in this respect:
• Taxation is large enough relative to unemployment beneﬁts. This implies that the intercept
of  is negative in Figure 6.
• Monitoring is large enough. We formally assume that 
(+)(−)
  This implies that the
value function of  is steeper than .
From the value functions, we can get an expression for the reservation productivity. The reser-
vation value , if it exists, is the crossing point of the two lines. Its formal expression, when
considering  and  exogenous and constant is
 =
( +  +  + ) − ( + )( +  +  + )
 +(  + )( − )
Existence in partial equilibrium requires 0, and the two key assumptions above ensure
that  is positive. The equilibrium that we are considering implies that shadow jobs are occupied
by workers with low skills, in line with the evidence discussed in Boeri and Garibaldi (2005) and
further discussed in Section 4 of this paper. The sorting of workers by productivity in the two
sectors, is a key premise of our theoretical analysis
Remark 1 When there is no minimum wage, shadow jobs are occupied by relatively low skilled
workers.
There are several results in the partial equilibrium setting, and are graphically obtained by
shifts and movements of the two lines. They can be summarized as follows:
• An increase in unemployment beneﬁts reduces the reservation productivity ,s ot h a tm o r e
people search in the legal market. At given job ﬁnding rates, an increase in unemployment




15Figure 6: Workers’ sorting in partial equilibrium (with constant job ﬁnding rate)
• An increase in taxation increases shadow employment. This is the standard mechanism that
taxation moves away people from the regular sector into the shadow employment. Formally,




• An increase in the monitoring rate reduces shadow employment. An increase in the monitoring
rate reduces the return from shadow employment and induces people to search in the legal




3.7 Workers’ sorting with a binding minimum wage
The presence of the minimum wage modiﬁes the workers’ sorting behaviour. The minimum wage is
by deﬁnition paid only in the formal sector. As a result, the worker’s value of unemployment after
the introduction of a mnimum wage is
()= +
[ − ] − 









++() if ( − ) ≥ min;
 + (
) min−
++() if ( − )  min
The introduction of the minimum wage implies that the value function has a kink at  =
min
 − ; Since the minimum wage applies only to formal sector jobs, we say that the minimum
wage is binding if   . In what follows we assume that is indeed the case. Figure 7 displays this
case. When the minimum wage is binding, the two value function cross twice, and the partition of
w o r k e r sa c r o s st h et w os e c t o r si sg o v e r n e db yt wo reservation values. In particular, deﬁne as ,
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The introduction of the minimum wage changes the allocation of workers across the two sectors.
Speciﬁcally, with the introduction of the minimum wage workers allocate to the regular sector if
  and  ; Conversely, workers belong to the shadow sector if   . The allocation
is displayed in Figure 8. We are now in a position to derive three key implications of our analysis
Proposition 1 The introduction of the minimum wage changes the skill composition of workers
in the shadow sector and in the regular sector. In particular, the skill composition of workers in
the shadow sector increases
Proposition 2 Moonlight eﬀect. The introduction of the minimum wage increases the average
wage in the shadow sector
Proposition 3 The introduction of the minimum wage increases the supply of low skill workers in
the regular sector
Proposition 1 is straightforward and can be easily seen with the help of Figure 8. The minimum
wage introduces an additional threshold in the allocation of workers across skills. Workers in the
regular sector are now not only the workers with individual productivity above  but also workers
with productivity below . Conversely, workers in the shadow sectors are those workers that
have productivity between the two reservation values. The latter observation leads immediately
17to Proposition 2. The model presented implies a moonlinght eﬀect in the shadow sector. In the
aftermath of the introduction of the minimum wage the average wage in the shadow sector increases.
To see the moonlight eﬀect more formally, let 
1 and 
 be the average wage in the shadow before












Proposition 3 is a corollary of the moonlight eﬀect. Very low skill workers are now supplying
their skills in the regular sector. This clearly reduces the average skills of workers in the regular
sector. Note that all these results are obtained in partial equilibrium, at given labor demand. The
next section brieﬂy illustrates how these results may change when labor demand is properly taken
into account.
Figure 7: The Eﬀect of the Minimum wage on the value of a job in the regular sector
3.8 Labor Demand, Job Creation and General Equilibrium
Job creation in both sectors is obtained by obtaining the average value of the job in both sectors.
Boeri and Garibaldi (2005) show the analytics of the model in details and also how to obtain the
18Figure 8: The labour supply eﬀects of the introduction of the minimum wage
general equilibrium. In this paper we only discuss the results qualitatively. Market tightness  and
the associated job ﬁnding rates  depend on the various parameters, as well as on the workers’
sorting behavior. Most parameters have a direct eﬀect on job creation, plus an indirect eﬀect via
the reservation productivity . Formally, we can write
()=(()min))
()=(()min))
where the symbol () suggests that  is itself an endogenous variable. Some important comparative
static results follow
• An increase in the reservation productivity  increases market tightness and the job ﬁnding
r a t e si nb o t hs e c t o r s .A ni n c r e a s ei n increases the average quality of the workforce in both
sectors, so that ﬁrms naturally respond by posting more vacancies per unemployed. This
result is important, and shows how sorting aﬀects job creation.
• An increase in unemployment beneﬁts , at given reservation productivity  reduces job
creation in the legal sector. This is the standard adverse eﬀe c to fu n e m p l o y m e n ti n c o m eo n
job creation, an eﬀect that works mainly through the wage rule.
19• An increase in taxation, at given reservation productivity , reduces job creation in the legal
sector. This is also a textbook adverse labor demand eﬀect of taxation
• An increase in the monitoring rate , at given reservation productivity  reduces job creation
in the shadow sector. Higher monitoring rate acts as an increase in the destruction rate on
shadow jobs.
• The introduction of the minimum wage reduces job creation in the legal sector. This result is
important in the context of this paper and is farily straighforward. On the labor demand side
of the market, the introduction of the minimum wage is akin to an increase in the expected
costs related to the job. This increase in costs naturally reduces job creation in the shadow
sector. At the same time, since the average skill increases in the shadow sector, job creation
in the shadow sector increases
Figure 9: Minimum Wage with the Labor Demand Eﬀects
The general equilibrium of the model is obtained by solving for the two reservation productivities
and market tightness levels   . While we refer to Boeri and Garibaldi (2005) for the
analytical details of the analysis, in what follows we just consider the qualitative eﬀects of the
introduction of the minimum wage. Figure 9 show the qualitative results of the analysis. The main
eﬀect of the introduction of the minimum wage is the reduction of the value of unemloyment in
20the regular sector. This cost eﬀect is akin to a downard shift of the value of unemployment in the
regular sector. As the ﬁgure shows, these general equilibrium eﬀects have two further eﬀects on
the shadow sector. FIrst, the shadow sector expand since the relative value of a job in the regular
sector is reduced vis-a-vis the shadow sector. Second, the skill composition of the workforce in the
shadow sector increases. These two eﬀects can be summarized in the following propositions.
Proposition 4 Moonlight eﬀect is also present in the general equilibrium setting, since the average
skills of workers in the shadow sector increase.
Proposition 5 The size of the shadow sector increases with the introduction of the minimum wage
In the next section we go back to the data and consider whether these implications are consistent
with the evidence on the moonlight eﬀect in Brazil.
4B a c k t o t h e D a t a
We proceed in three steps in order to test the empirical relevance of our explanation of the lighthouse
eﬀect. First we obtain some empirical proxy for the skill level of the workers in the two sectors. Our
model has a key prediction in terms of allocation of skills between the two sectors and the baseline
model implies that the shadow sector has a lower skill composition than the formal sector. Next,
we analyse the correlation of these proxies (ﬁxed-eﬀects in a wage equation) with observed data
on educational attainments. Finally we look at transitions between formal and informal sector at
diﬀerent deciles of the distribution of ﬁxed-eﬀects and we provide an estimate of the fraction of the
change in wages in the informal sectors which can be accounted for by sorting eﬀects, as opposed
to lighthouse eﬀects.
4.1 Fixed eﬀects estimates
Exploiting the longitudinal structure of data we estimate for each year in our sample the following
regression
log()= +  +  
21where  is an individual ﬁxed-eﬀect,  is a set of time (monthly) dummies, and  captures
individual time-varying eﬀects, notably tenure on any job. This equation was estimated only on
workers being employed for at least two-periods covered by our data in order to recover the ﬁxed
eﬀect. The latter should oﬀer a measure of observable and unobservable time-invariant diﬀerences
in the skills of individuals.
Table 3 displays the correlation of these estimated ﬁxed eﬀects with the stated years of schooling.
As shown by the table, the correlation is always positive and statistically signiﬁcant. This is fairly
encouraging as we expect skills to be positively correlated to schooling








Figure 10 displays the distributions of ﬁxed eﬀects for the populations of formal sector (dark
histograms) and informal sector workers in 1995. Similar charts are available from the authors
for the other years covered by data and provide the same information. In essence, informal sector
workers do have systematically lower ﬁxed eﬀects than formal sector workers. This is in line with
the substantive assumptions of our model.
4.2 Shifts across the shadow margins
Our model explains the increase in wages in the informal sector following a minimum wage hike
as a byproduct of sorting of workers across the shadow margins. Proposition (4) and (5) make
this point clear. An increase in the minimum wage induces shifts of low-skilled workers from the
informal to the formal sector and shifts of relatively high skill workers from the formal sector to the
informal sector. This increases the average productivity of workers in the informal sector inducing
higher job creation in this segment.
A test of the implications of our model is therefore in looking at transitions across the shadow
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Figure 10: Distributions of ﬁxed eﬀects for the formal and imformal populations of workers
sector jobs, IF vice versa) by decile of the ﬁxed-eﬀects distribution. The transitions are from the
state occupied by the individuals in the 3 months before the minimum wage hikes to the state
occupied in the 6 months after the increase in the minimum wage. We consider only one-way
transitions, e.g., we rule out workers going from formal to informal and then back to formal sector
jobs
Table 4. Transitions across sectors by decile of the FE distribution
Deciles from the FI IF











23The key message provided by the table is that shifts from the formal to the informal sector
involves mainly the lowest skill types of the distribution of ﬁxed eﬀects in the formal sector. Amost
one worker out of ﬁve in the lowest decile experience a transition from the formal to the informal
sector, compared with one out of thirty in the upper deciles of the skill distributions. Sizeable
transitions from the informal to the formal sector occur at all deciles of the ﬁxed-eﬀect distribution
in the informal sector, and are increasing with our proxy for skills.
We interpret these results as broadly in line with the qualitative sorting eﬀects predicted by our
model.
Finally, Table 5 decomposes the total variation in wages in the informal sector between light-
house and sorting eﬀects. In particular, it disantangles the changes in the average wage of those
workers who have been continuously working in the informal sector before and after the minimum
wage hike (the lighthouse component) from the residual sorting component, which is associated











 denotes the variation in the average wage in the informal sector between the three
months preceding the change in the minimum wage (generally January, February and March)
and the three months after the minimum wage hike (June, July and August); ∆
_
 denotes the
same variation conditioning on workers who have been working through the entire period in the
informal sector,  is the stayer coeﬃcient of a transition matrix mapping ﬂows from the informal
to the formal sector, while ∆
_
 denotes the variation in the minimum wage for those who were
in the informal sector either before or after the minimum wage change but not in both periods.
In other words, we consider that the signal eﬀect is relevant for wage renegotiation for those
working continuously in the informal sector, while changes in the average wage between those
leaving the informal sector after the minimum wage hike and those entering subsequently capture
the compositional eﬀects related to the sorting of workers by skills.
The message delivered by Tables is that the sorting component explains at least one third of
the increase in the average wage in the informal sector. Signiﬁcantly this contribution is increasing
over time, while the lighthouse eﬀects in some years (e.g., 2000) is negative.
24Table 5. Sorting and lighthouse eﬀects: assessing the contributions
1995 1996
∆ ∆
Total variation 32.8 Total variation 21.7
contribution lighthouse 22.2 (68%) contribution lighthouse 13.7 (63%)
contribution sorting 10.6 (32%) contribution sorting 8.0 (37%)
1999 2000
∆ ∆
Total variation 6.4 Total variation 6.0
contribution lighthouse 3.9 (41%) contribution lighthouse -0.5 (-7%)
contribution sorting 2.5 (39%) contribution sorting 6.4 (107%)
5F i n a l R e m a r k s
The increasing literature on minimum wages in developing countries documented that, contrary
to standard predictions of economic theory, average wages in the informal sector tend to react
positively to an increase in the minimum wage in the formal sector. This eﬀect has been explained
as a lighthouse eﬀect, that is a signal oﬀered by the minimum wage to wage setting in the informal
sector, but this explanation has never been tested empirically.
In this paper we provided an alternative explanation for this puzzle which is based on sorting
of workers across the shadow margins. We also extended a general equilibrium model of the labor
market to characterise the type of sorting that it is expected to occur after a minimum wage hike.
Finally, we went back to the data to test the key implications of the model. We found that the skill
composition of outﬂows from the informal sector to the formal sector and vice versa are broadly
in line with the implications of the model, predicting an increase in te average skill level in the
informal sector. Thus, sorting of workers across the two margins always contribute to increasing
the average wage between the period before and after the minimum wage hike. This sorting eﬀect
explains at least one third of the total increase in average wages in the informal sector in the three
months after the increase in the minimum wage with respect to the conditions prevailing before
25the minimum wage hike.
Further work may look at the implications of sorting for other moments of the distribution of
wages in the informal sector and apply alternative decomposition techniques to evaluate the eﬀects
of minimum wage changes over the entire distribution of wages in the informal sector. It would
also be important to anayse more in detail wage setting in the informal sector possibly relying on
ad-hoc surveys eliciting wage and working conditions in this segment of the economy.
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